Author: Don Reeves

1. One of the trends identified by Judt is the transition towards the “European” style of politics and society. Tenets of this stylization include the idealization of the stable welfare state, liberal democracies with a decidedly progressive leaning later in the 20th century, and generally risk-averse conduct as a modus operandi. Its formation took time, and eventually took on anti-Atlanticist tones in that the style sought to distinguish itself from the “American” style of politics. This can be witnessed at large in the creation of the European Union in 2002, which mostly promotes such modalities and seeks to avoid warfare through a sense of a pan-European alliance. The pre-1945 European continent had witnessed its fair share of solely nationalist ideas that had little application outside of a single state; for example, National German socialism or Ceausescu’s Romanian strand of communism were extreme and dictatorial, and could not be considered constituent parts of a broader “European” ideology.
2. As European politics shifted, the political topography was marked by the evaporation of the traditional divide between left and right in political parties. Judt calls this the death of the “old-style political party” (785). Especially in the modern day, there is more overlap in terms of several concepts: “anti-Capitalism,” anti-globalization, fears of immigration, and resistance to cultural sacrifice in the name of supranational organizations like the E.U.
3. Judt focuses on the seeming dissolution of the European nation-state around 1945, and a gradual restoration after World War II. He describes this in relatively positive terms, so it would not make sense to return to a model that he views as detrimental to European progress and status.

The Economist‘s “Africa Rising – the Hopeful Continent” article presents an interesting inquiry into the potential for the poorest inhabited continent on Earth to grow and transform in the midst of seemingly positive trends in many of its constituent states. Some people decried the publication’s neoliberal bias, and have since proposed solutions that favor the economic left. Yet evidence exists in this article and beyond that is suggestive of an Africa that could benefit equitably and to a greater extent through expanding markets, trade, and investment – decidedly capitalist concepts. The key would be to make them investment-positive and enticing for their potential role in a global economy; however, they must find stability and ensure that they are not dominated by foreign enterprises that do not benefit the African nations themselves in a colonialism-esque fashion. Socialism and its varied flavors of the day have tried and failed, despite initial optimism, to make change to Africa’s economic situation. These failed endeavors were not bolstered by misguided efforts of foreign nations to pour capital into the continental economy and hope that it will be equitably distributed through governmental and perhaps extra-governmental efforts. It would seem that Africa is ripe for investment and market-driven growth. Still, this in a vacuum would be unlikely to stimulate change on a supranational level, and given the history of strife and poverty plaguing the continent at large, it is ill-advised to put all of one’s faith into a single economic model to bring about badly-needed economic aid to Africans.

The most well-defined and documented imperialism of the twentieth century was Japanese geographical and cultural expansionism. In a sense, Japanese imperialism in China and especially in Korea furthered East Asian cultural continuity and assimilation; that is, while it is naïve to view all nations of East Asia as monolithic, a forced spread of Japanese and Asian-influenced culture was effected by their imperial efforts during this time. Japan left its mark on Korea and China through a cultural exchange, albeit a somewhat forced exchange. This meant that a common thread of East Asian culture emerged with a vaguely Japanese undertone expressed in their formation of independent nation-states.

As documented in the two primary sources on “comfort women,” Japanese imperialism left an ugly legacy on Asia and the Sino-Korean perception of Japan. With a modernized military and a newly mobilized economy as a result of nationalized “Westernization” applied in tandem with a core preservation of Japanese culture, Japan felt ready to force itself on its neighbors. This was not some benign act of modernization or multilateral cooperation; it was an obfuscated yet overt act of self-proclaimed superiority that left destruction and pain in its wake. Korean and Chinese women were rendered as sex slaves. These sources are likely a microcosm of a broad campaign of rape and indignation that was viewed as a justifiable collateral damage or simply the spoils of war. As mentioned by the esteemed Professor Bonk of the College of Wooster, modern China commemorates the date of the Nanking Massacre to ensure that imperial Japan’s atrocities in the Asian theatre are not forgotten, which is a tacit statement of unresolved resent between them regarding this dark period in Asia’s history.

An important motif of modernizing or potentially modernizing countries at the turn of the 20th century is the sense of nationalist duty that certain writers and intellectuals seem to impart in their descriptions of the processes of visibly modernizing their respective nations. This is not done identically across the board, however. Yukichi seems initially hesitant to embrace the spread of Westernization, remarking that “[Eastern nations] may be all right if they are resolved to defend themselves to the end in resistance to the force of the eastward advance of their civilization” (129). However, he concedes that doing so is not a prudent survival strategy, and then pivots to a nearly apologist position of the Western spread. Notable is his rhetoric that describes the great advanced mentality and innovation of the Japanese as a whole, and how they would inevitably be dragged down by perceptions of backwardness if they did not seize this opportunity to become productive world players with modern technology and thinking. China and Korea are preemptively scapegoated for contrast in this regard. All of this is rooted in a newly modern sense of national identity, of Japan as an island nation with great history and a responsibility to preserve their own greatness.

Similarly, “The Export Boom as Modernity” and its accompanying interview with former Mexican president Porfirio Diaz discusses the duality of progress in Latin America, with many native or supposedly undesirable populations becoming victims of progress as modernization took root, but both the author and interviewer James Creelman seem to take the a stance of utilitarianism, deciding that such progress is beneficial to the nation at large, even if it means cracking a few bones in the process. The author discusses how Mexico leapt out of a state of chaos for the benefit of Mexico as a nation in the modern sense of a nation. New infrastructure and visible signs of progress were good for the welfare and dignity of Mexicans. Creelman, on the other hand, seems to flatter the cult of personality, hero-nationalist status of Porfirio, complementing the beauty of Mexico (as well as the handsome former general himself) while seeming able to overlook the iron fist of his military-inspired rule to achieve progress. This was yet another product of nationalism and national pride, regalling Mexico as a whole rather than just a city or a subset of the population.

The case of the lecture on Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, may have been somewhat different when compared with the previous two sources. There was no evidence that Brazilian greatness was used as a driver of progress. However, inspiration from European cities and mannerisms, combined with an enthusiasm for mass European immigration to “whiten” their population, are evident of some sort of efforts to mold their nation into a model that they see fit.

 

Through a good degree of circumlocution, Bright and Geyer produce an alternative thesis to the traditional model of the rise of the contemporary world, specifically in regards to the ostensible nexus between Westernization and globalization. Rather than concurring with the slippery slope of reducing it to terms of “innovation” by the Atlantic core (Europe and North America, with mostly white populations) and the “catching up” of the rest of the world, they propose that the real model was one of “exploitation” followed by “survival strategies” by the exploited regions, to include “resistance, appropriation, reassertion of difference,” among others, according to a summary by the esteemed Professor Bonk of the College of Wooster. This is certainly a correct interpretation at large; much of the material and human resources necessary for Atlantic technological and societal advancement were obtained at the great cost of exploiting the people and resources of existing sovereignties. They had to choose between co-opting the colonizing powers to ensure their survival or fighting back to preserve their culture and maintain their dignity. However, the most appropriate model would take the former and latter theses and hybridize them into one unified body of understanding. It was exploitation that contributed to innovation, and the exploited had to choose a survival strategy, which in the modern world has become almost universally an attempt to “catch up,” even among nations and peoples that initially resisted the forces of globalized Europeanization and industrialism.